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DON’T TREAD ON ME…ONLINE:
THE FEC SHOULD STAY OUT OF FREE
INTERNET-BASED POLITICAL SPEECH
Timothy J. D’Elia *

I. INTRODUCTION
Written letters, public postings, and print media provided a vehicle for political speech in America for nearly three centuries. 1 One of the first American
newspapers, the New England Courant, published a letter in 1722, in which the
author commented: “whoever would overthrow the Liberty of a Nation, must
begin by subduing the Freeness of Speech.” 2 The tone and medium of political
speech have changed, but free speech remains one of America’s most cherished fundamental rights. 3 The advent of the Internet created a new populist
forum for political speech, replacing historical speech vehicles like Franklin’s
*
J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.S., 2004, Indiana University. The author would like to thank Professor Mark Rienzi for
his guidance throughout the writing process as well as his colleagues at the Catholic University of America, Journal of Law and Technology for their editing assistance. The author
would also like to thank Commissioner Lee E. Goodman and his staff for their candor and
responsiveness to an unknown law student’s questions.
1
Randolph E. Schmid, U.S. Postal Service Survey Reveals Personal Letters at Record
POST
(Oct.
3,
2011,
12:46
PM),
Low,
HUFF.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/03/postal-service-annual-survey-personalletters_n_992432 (statement of Prof. Webster Newbold) (“Letters were the prime medium
of communication among individuals and even important in communities as letters were
shared, read aloud and published.”).
2
Letter no. 8 from Silence Dogood to the Author of the New-England Courant (July 9,
1722),
in
49
THE
NEW-ENGLAND
COURANT,
http://www.masshist.org/online/silence_dogood/imgviewer.php?item_id=645&img_step=1&tpc=&pid=&mode=small&tpc=&pid=#page1.
3
Elec. Frontier Found. & Ctr. for Dem. & Tech., Comment Letter on Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking on Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits at 2 (Jan. 15, 2015),
[hereinafter
EFF
&
CDT
Comments],
https://www.eff.org/files/2015/01/15/eff_and_cdt_comments_re_internet_regulations_jan._
15_2015.pdf (“Furthermore, the United States has a long tradition of anonymous political
speech, dating back as far as Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense” and many of the Federalist
Papers.”).
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letter or Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense” pamphlet. 4
The Internet has created an unparalleled forum for First Amendment expression, where any and all speakers can drive the marketplace of social ideas,
opinions, and conscience. 5 The technology of the Internet is unique among
forums for disseminating political speech content because one Internet user
may instantaneously share political speech with a massive audience. 6 Any citizen has the potential to influence a large audience with political speech content
using only an Internet connection and a desire to participate in the debate. 7
Now in 140 characters or less, Twitter users offer political opinions, “retweet”
the comments of others, get real-time news updates, and use “hashtags” to
identify the discussion of common topics and interests. 8 On Facebook, members “follow” the conversations and whereabouts of people who interest them,
give “likes” to those they agree with, and occasionally study opposing viewpoints. 9
4
See generally The Rise of the Internet, IBM 100, http://www03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/internetrise/impacts (last visited Oct. 30, 2015)
(“The Internet has transformed how people live, work, shop and communicate. Its impact on
business, research, global politics and communication cannot be overestimated.”).
5
See THE FRONTIER LAB, WATCHING YOU: PRIVATE GIVING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
4 (2015), http://thefrontierlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/TFL_WatchingYou_020615_Final_72.pdf (“Respondents consistently remarked that they felt Free Speech,
as a whole is not threatened and in fact is thriving. As evidence they cited the Internet and
its creation of a more robust channel for information exchange, including a way to voice
dissent.”); see also Lee E. Goodman, Online Political Opinions Don’t Need Regulating,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2015, at A15 [hereinafter Goodman, Online Political Opinions] (“Millions of citizens are now empowered to speak widely as commenters, bloggers, podcasters,
YouTube posters and Facebook supporters, while new technologies have facilitated a record
number of new political communities at a fraction of historical costs.”).
6
See Viral Video, TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/26863/viralvideo (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (defining viral videos as a video clip that is rapidly spread
online).
7
Derek Willis, Coming to Your Facebook Feed: More Political Videos, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/upshot/coming-to-your-facebook-feedmore-political-videos.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0 (“Although “red-meat” ads might generate likes or shares among a candidate or party’s base — a valuable outcome — it can be
hard for them to gain wider traction online and take advantage of a social network, where
ideas and images move from user to user.”).
8
See FAQs about Retweets (RT), TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/77606faqs-about-retweets-rt (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (stating that a Retweet is a “re-posting of
someone else’s Tweet,” done to immediately share with all of your followers, and that a
Tweet that begins with “RT” indicates that it is re-posting someone else’s content); see also
Elizabeth Kricfalusi, The Twitter Hashtag: What Is It and How Do You Use It?, TECH FOR
LUDDITES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://techforluddites.com/the-twitter-hashtag-what-is-it-and-howdo-you-use-it/ (noting that a hashtag is signified by the “#” symbol preceding a word or
phrase and is used as a method “for people to search for tweets that have a common topic”).
9
What
does
it
mean
to
follow
someone?
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/279614732052951 (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
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The Internet is also increasingly competing with fee-based television, radio,
and print mass media to become the dominant venue for political communication in America. 10 Countless blogs contribute to the discussion of news stories
with a never-ending stream of opinion pieces, reporting, and analysis. 11 Another genre of websites, commonly called “news aggregators,” 12 post a selection
of current news stories and opinion pieces from sources collected across the
Internet and from around the world. 13 YouTube has become especially prominent in the world of politics. 14 Streaming video clips of interviews, videoblogs, educational segments, and documentaries are posted and subject to their
own viewer commentary on YouTube. 15
For example, free videos posted on YouTube by Barrack Obama’s 2008
presidential campaign were watched for a total of 14.5 million hours. 16 According to statistics from Blue State Digital, the Obama campaign’s online efforts
included the creation of more than 400,000 blog entries, organizing 45,000
volunteer groups online, and posting over 1,000 YouTube videos supporting
the candidate. 17 Despite being a dynamic and egalitarian venue for pure First
Amendment political speech, proponents of expanding campaign finance laws
want to limit the content and quantity of speech on the Internet. 18
10 LEE E. GOODMAN, LAW AND ELECTION POLITICS: THE RULES OF THE GAME 50-51
(Matthew J. Streb ed., 2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter GOODMAN, LAW & ELECTION POLITICS].
11 See, e.g., Frank Vyan Walton, Some [More] Policy Suggestions for #BlackLivesMatKOS
(Aug.
23,
2015,
7:47
AM),
ter,
DAILY
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/08/23/1413975/-Some-More-Policy-Suggestions-forBlackLivesMatter; Andrew Stuttaford, The War on Drugs Backfires Again, RICOCHET (Aug.
23, 2015), https://ricochet.com/war-drugs-backfires/; ACE OF SPADES HQ, http://ace.mu.nu
(last
visited
Aug.
23,
2015);
HUFFPOST
POLITICS:
THE
BLOGS,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/politics/the-blog (last visited Aug. 23, 2015). See also Chris
Cillizza, The Fix’s best state based political blogs – extended edition!, WASH. POST (Mar.
12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/12/the-fixs-best-statebased-political-blogs-extended-edition (providing an extensive list of reader nominated
political blogs in all 50 states, although West Virginia submitted no entry).
12 See Kimberly Isbell, The Rise of the News Aggregator: Legal Implications and Best
Practices 2 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc., Res. Pub. No. 2010-10, 2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670339.
13 See, e.g., DRUDGE REPORT, www.drudgereport.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2015);
HUFF. POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2015); SAYFIE REVIEW,
http://www.sayfiereview.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2015); REAL CLEAR POLITICS,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/?state=nwa (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
14 The Youtube-ification of Politics: Candidates losing control, CNN.COM (Jul. 18,
2007,
7:42
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/07/18/youtube.effect/index.html?eref=rss_tech.
15 About YouTube, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/ (last visited Aug. 23,
2015).
16 GOODMAN, LAW AND ELECTION POLITICS, supra note 10, at 49-50.
17 Id. at 50.
18 Statement of Reasons, Vice Chair Ravel at 1-2, MUR 6729 (Checks and Balances)
[hereinafter SOR, Vice Chair Ravel, MUR 6729].
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In response to these advances in technology and the recent holdings of the
Supreme Court, the Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or the “Commission”) issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) on
October 17, 2014. 19 Based on subsequent Commission activity, three Commissioners issued a statement on October 29, 2014, seeking to clarify the scope of
the ANPRM’s inquiry by encouraging the public to comment on the FEC’s
treatment of online activity. 20 The public responded with roughly 5,000 comments weighing in on the merits of regulating Internet-based political speech. 21
The Commission’s inquiry into regulating free Internet-based political
speech should resolve that such proposals misunderstand current laws and fundamentally undervalue the importance of unfettered political speech. Speech
cannot be regulated merely because advancements in communications technology might increase the reach and influence of political commentary on the Internet. Utilizing the tools of the Internet to voice political speech does not create the appearance or the actuality of corruption. In the absence of quid pro
quo corruption, the FEC does not have statutory authority, nor is there a constitutional basis, to regulate free speech. Imposing restrictions on cost-free Internet content would create a chilling effect on an incredible forum for disseminating political ideas and opinions. Ultimately, the policy of regulating free
political Internet content uses conjectures of corruption to justify a regulatory
remedy that is not needed.
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of free speech doctrine as it has
been developed in response to various government efforts to restrict political
speech. Part II examines the FEC’s 2006 Internet rules and responds to recent
calls to reevaluate them. Part III argues that the FEC lacks the statutory authority to effectuate further restrictions on free political Internet content. Part IV
argues that restricting political speech on the Internet through disclosure and
disclaimer requirements is facially unconstitutional and would chill political
speech. Finally, Part V asserts that even if the FEC maintains statutory and
constitutional authority to regulate free political speech on the Internet, doing
so would be a misguided hindrance to democracy.

19

2014).

Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits, 79 Fed. Reg. 62,361, 62,361 (Oct. 17,

Id.
See Colby Itkowitz, FEC deluge: Thousands Comment On the Issue of Money In
Politics, WASH. POST. (Jan. 27, 2015) (stating that approximately 75 percent of the people
who weighed in were in favor of greater regulation from the FEC); see also Press Release,
Fed. Election Comm’n., FEC Hears Wide Public Comment on the McCutcheon v. FEC
(Feb. 11, 2015) (on file with author) (noting that specifically over 32,000 people from
across the country participated in the public commenting process).
20
21
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II. THE ABC’S OF REGULATING POLITICAL SPEECH: FROM ALIEN
ACTS TO BUCKLEY AND CITIZEN’S UNITED
The right to free political speech is foundational to the concepts of liberty
and democracy in America. 22 American citizens have exercised this right since
the Founders announced, “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires
that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.” 23
Since our Declaration of Independence, there has been a tug-of-war between
assertions of governmental authority to limit the influence of speech, 24 and
speakers who challenge the government’s power to moderate political speech. 25
A. Free Speech for All...As Long as the Government Approves
Twenty years after the United States was formed in rejection of the unquestionable authority of the British Monarchy, the Alien and Sedition Acts outlawed even the intent to oppose any measure of the government. 26 Other less
egregious attempts to control speech content include indirectly limiting politi22 Floyd Abrams & Burt Neuborne, Debating ‘Citizens United’, THENATION.COM, (Jan.
13, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/157720/debating-citizens-united (describing the
decision of Citizens United as rooted in the well-established legal proposition that “political
speech, especially political speech about whom to vote for or against, is at the core of the
First Amendment”).
23 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
24 See e.g., Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (prohibiting corporations from
making money contributions in connection with political elections); see also Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 § 304, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 15960 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(5)) (prohibiting labor unions from making monetary
contributions in connection with political elections); see also Lee E. Goodman, The Feds
Flirt With Reining in TV Talk, WALL ST. J ., Feb. 4, 2014, at A17 [hereinafter Goodman,
Feds Flirt With TV].
History is rife with government efforts to disrupt, investigate and even silence dissenting published opinion. From early colonial times when royal governments punished and shuttered printers critical of royal governors, to film-review-board censorship, attempts to enjoin the printing of the Pentagon Papers and, more recently, government preying into journalists’ telephone records, government power has proved
to be a dangerous threat to freedom of the press.
Id.
25 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Premised
on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor
certain subjects or viewpoints.”) (citing United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)); see also George Will, Policing Political Speech, NAT’L
REVIEW (Apr. 19, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/376018/policingpolitical-speech-george-will (commenting on Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus which
addressed an Ohio election law regulating the “false statements” made in political campaigns, “[t]hese developments are not coincidental. Government’s increasing reach and
pretensions necessarily become increasingly indiscriminate.”).
26 See Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596 (Jul. 14, 1798) (this law was one of four laws
known collectively as the Alien and Sedition Acts).
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cal speech by moderating “fairness” in public debate, 27 and governmental determinations of which content is “critical” to the free exchange of ideas. 28 Congress recently asserted a view on the permissible influence of political speech,
when 48 Senators voted to rewrite the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 29 Likewise, retired Justice John Paul Stevens suggested that the First
Amendment should be modified to reflect his beliefs on the proper allocations
of influence for political speech. 30
B. The FEC’s Constitutional Authority is Discovered Two Hundred Years
After the First Amendment is Authored
The Supreme Court is frequently called upon to resolve differing interpreta27 See KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40009, FAIRNESS DOCTRINE:
HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 1-3 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40009.pdf
(providing the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) policy between 1949 and
1987 known as the “Fairness Doctrine,” as the requirement that broadcasters identify issues
of public importance, cover those issues, and afford representatives of opposing viewpoints
the opportunity to present their case to the community; and, the FCC’s conclusion that the
policy likely violated the First Amendment); see also General Fairness Doctrine Obligations
of Broadcast Licensees, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,418 (Aug. 8, 1985) (discussing the FCC’s analysis
of the unconstitutional chilling effect of the Fairness Doctrine).
28 See SOC. SOLUTIONS INT’L INC., RESEARCH DESIGN FOR THE MULTI-MARKET STUDY
OF
CRITICAL INFORMATION NEEDS 2 (2013), https://transition.fcc.gov/ bureaus/ocbo/FCC_Final_Research_Design_6_markets.pdf (defining goals and a research
design plan for identifying and understanding the “Critical Information Needs” (“CIN”) of
the American public); but cf. Ajit Pai, The FCC Wades Into the Newsroom, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 10, 2014, at A14 (stating the opinion of FCC Commissioner Ajit Pai that the CIN study
improperly pressures media organizations to cover categories of news that the FCC has
selected); see also Truthy: Information diffusion research at Indiana University, INDIANA.EDU, http://truthy.indiana.edu (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) (featuring a highly controversial study federally funded by the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) on how information, known as “memes,” spread on social media); see also MIKE GONZALEZ, THE HERITAGE FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 4287, CONGRESS MUST STOP YET ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO MUFFLE FREE SPEECH 1-2 (2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/IB4287.pdf
(arguing that the NSF seeks to constrain free speech to detect political smears, astroturfing,
misinformation, and other social pollution on social media and “mitigate the diffusion of
false and misleading ideas, detect hate speech and subversive propaganda, and assist in the
preservation of open debate”) (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
29 See S. J. Res. 19, 113th Cong. § 1 (2014) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution that allows Congress and the States to “regulate and set reasonable limits on the raising
and spending of money by candidates and others to influence elections.”).
30 See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE
THE CONSTITUTION 79 (2014)
I therefore propose this amendment to the Constitution: Neither the First Amendment nor any other provisions of this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit the
Congress or any state from imposing reasonable limits on the amount of money that
candidates for public office, or their supporters, may spend in election campaigns.
Id.
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tions of the government’s ability to limit speech. 31 The Court has consistently
affirmed the people’s right to an “unfettered” exchange of ideas for bringing
about political and social change.32 Included in the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence is the inherent right to make political contributions and expenditures to support an idea, a candidate, or target a particular audience. 33 However,
the Court’s interpretations of applying these axioms continue to evolve. 34
The FEC was created by an act of Congress in 1974 35 to be a watchdog for
31 See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014) (challenging an Ohio statute that prohibits certain “false statements” during the course of a political
campaign on the grounds that the petitioner sufficiently established standing to make a preenforcement challenge justiciable); see also, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967) (striking down as unconstitutional, a New York
law that required state university employees to certify that they were not members of the
Communist party, or if they had ever been, requiring the employees to notify the university’s president); see also, e.g., United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 121-23
(1948) (holding that the prohibition of any “expenditure in connection with any election” as
applicable to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, could not be interpreted to prohibit organizations from publishing periodicals advising their members, stockholders or
customers, about the danger or advantage of particular measures, or electing candidates who
support those measures); see also, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919)
(finding that the distribution of leaflets using language in opposition of the draft was not
protected by the First Amendment right to free speech).
32 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured
by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional
safeguard, we have said, was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. (internal
quotation omitted).
Id.
33 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314 (“All speakers, including individuals and the
media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First
Amendment protects the resulting speech.”); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,
514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995) (“Nonetheless, even though money may “talk,” its speech is less
specific, less personal, and less provocative than a handbill—and as a result, when money
supports an unpopular viewpoint it is less likely to precipitate retaliation.”); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976)
[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the
expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails
printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political
speech.
Id.
34 See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1436 (2014) (“The right
to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute. Congress may regulate…”); see also Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 310.
35 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 § 310(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 93443, 88 Stat. 1263, 1280-81 (1974).
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the actuality and appearance of corruption in federal elections. In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo held that the FEC’s power to prevent corruption extended to limit
speech by a dollar amount. 36 The Court divined that when an individual or
group contributed in excess of $1,000 to a political candidate, the contribution
amounted to the actuality and appearance of corruption. 37 Various state and
federal laws enacted since Buckley have attempted to codify the view that
spending money to have a political voice be heard must be constrained by
amount, 38 restricted by the classification of speakers, 39 subject to broad disclosure requirements, 40 or counteracted by public funding, 41 to prevent real or perceived corruption in the exchange of ideas.
C. All Citizens Enjoy the Right to Political Speech
More recently, in Citizen’s United, the Court clarified the distinction between corruption and influence by restating the essential premise of the First
Amendment: political speech is a venerated right for which few government
interests suffice to justify speech limitations on any class of speaker. 42 Four
years later, McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n declared individual aggre36 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (“It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose—to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual
financial contributions—in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the
$1,000 contribution limitation.”).
37 Id.
38 See e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1434 (addressing the Federal Elections Campaign
Act’s (FECA) aggregate limit on candidate contributions and other contributions to party
committees).
39 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310 (challenging regulatory limits on campaign
spending by organizations); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right To Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 449 (2007) (challenging the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s
(“BCRA”) prohibition on the use of corporate funds to finance “electioneering communications” during pre-federal-election periods).
40 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003) (challenging several provisions of the BCRA regarding “soft money,” donations to tax-exempt organizations,
and the constitutional validity of several definitions within the Act) overruled by Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 310.
41 See Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2806
(2011) (challenging the constitutionality of an Arizona law that matched every dollar spent
by a privately-funded candidate with public funds for their publicly-funded opponents); see
also Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 724 (2008) (challenging provisions of
the BCRA that involved coordinated campaign spending from party committees for opponents of self-financed candidates).
42 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (“We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”).
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gate contribution limits as unconstitutional because the speech of individuals
may not be limited “simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to
restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others.” 43 The constitutional right to free political speech can be traced
from the nation’s founding to the present day, but new methods of exercising
free speech bring new interpretations of the First Amendment. 44
III. INTERNET SPEECH REGULATIONS? YEAH, WE’VE GOT THAT:
FEC CHAIR PROPOSES REEVALUATING COST-FREE POLITICAL
SPEECH ON THE INTERNET
During the 2012 election cycle, a nonprofit group called Checks and Balances for Economic Growth (“Checks and Balances”), posted two YouTube
videos that challenged comments made by President Obama and Senator Sherrod Brown about the coal industry. 45 The videos became controversial when a
nonprofit legal activist organization, called Citizens for Responsibility and
Ethics in Washington (“CREW”), 46 filed a complaint with the FEC, alleging
that the Checks and Balances’ YouTube videos violated the Federal Election
Campaign Act (“FECA” or “Act”). 47 The FEC reviewed the complaint and
failed to reach a majority vote necessary to enforce a violation against Checks
and Balances. 48 In response to the 3-to-3 deadlocked vote on these YouTube
videos, 49 FEC Chairwoman Ann M. Ravel 50 issued a statement calling for an
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441.
See, e.g., id. at 1438 (“The Government may no more restrict how many candidates or
causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse.”)
45 checks Balances, TV Ad: Why Would You Lie, YOUTUBE (Oct. 14, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9oE1O38-IIE; checks Balances, TV AD—The War on
Coal: Sherrod Brown vs. Ohio Coal Miners, YOUTUBE (Oct. 19, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgPkQYc0O5k.
46 About
Us, CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON,
http://www.citizensforethics.org/pages/about (last visited Aug. 27, 2015) (“CREW uses
high-impact legal actions to target government officials who sacrifice the common good to
special interests.”).
47 MUR
6729 (Checks and Balances), Compl. at 1 (Apr. 4, 2013),
http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/14044363701.pdf; see also Carl Franzen, Online Political
Ads Are More Secretive Than TV Ads, THE VERGE (Oct. 27, 2014, 4:45 PM),
http://www.theverge.com/2014/10/27/7079329/fec-democrats-want-to-investigate-onlinepolitical-ads.
48 See First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 1, MUR 6729 (Checks and Balances) (“First GCR”)
http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/14044363793.pdf (noting that the Deputy Secretary’s reported on the deadlocked 3-3 vote reflecting that the Commission failed to find reason to
believe Checks and Balances violated the provisions of the FECA as alleged).
49 See id.
50 About
the
FEC,
FED.
ELECTION
COMM’N
(Aug.
27,
2015),
http://www.fec.gov/members/ravel/ravel_bio.shtml. Ravel was elected to the Commission in
43
44

186

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 24.1

update to the Commission’s regulation of political content on the Internet. 51
A. The Genesis of the 2006 Internet Freedom Rules
Chairwoman Ravel’s analysis of the Checks and Balances vote, was that the
regulations issued to address Internet communications in 2006 were deficient
for the FEC’s purpose. 52 However, the regulations that created an exemption
for cost-free Internet speech were the product of a decade of lessons learned—
going back to the 1990’s—from the Commission’s attempts to regulate political content on the Internet. In 1995, the FEC tried to regulate websites as
“public communications” like radio or television advertisements. 53 In practice,
this method of broadly imposing traditional regulations on Internet communications included substantial challenges, such as, assigning a monetary value to
emails and websites. 54 As a result, the FEC altered its approach by attempting
to regulate Internet communications on a case-by-case basis, resulting in illfitting solutions and regulatory schizophrenia. 55
What the Commission ultimately designed in 2006 represents a thoughtful
balance of the anti-corruption values of traditional campaign finance regulations and protection of the low-cost populist participation in democracy facilitated by the Internet. 56 The Commission defined “Internet activities” as including, but not limited to, “[s]ending or forwarding electronic messages; providing a hyperlink or other direct access to another person’s website; blogging;
creating maintaining or hosting a website; paying a nominal fee for the use of
another person’s website; and any other form of communication distributed
over the Internet.” 57 Consistent with campaign finance restrictions on other
forms of communication, these regulations require that compensated Internet
communications must be disclosed by the political committee or campaign
2013, served as Vice Chairwoman in 2014 and serves as the Chairwoman in 2015. Id.
51 See SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 1, MUR 6729.
52 See id. at 1-2; see also Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18,589.
53 GOODMAN, LAW & ELECTION POLITICS, supra note 10, at 51 (citing FEC Advisory Op.
1995-1999).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 51-52.
56 Id. at 52.
The question the FEC continued to face was whether the Internet and its low-cost
technologies had eclipsed a complex cobweb of laws and regulations conceived for
the high-cost media-centered politics of the late twentieth century. An informed answer to that question required a thorough consideration of competing democratic
values – the anti-corruption values justifying the old restrictions versus the populist
democratic participation facilitated by the new technologies.
Id.
57 11 C.F.R. § 100.155(b) (2014).
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paying for the communication. 58 Uncompensated Internet communications do
not require reporting or disclaimer where the content is distributed for free and
only on the Internet. 59
Traditional campaign finance regulations require disclosure reports, in part,
based on expenditures for production and dissemination costs. 60 The FEC examined the role of expenditures and contributions for bloggers when promulgating the 2006 rules, and determined that individuals and groups of individuals should be free to engage political speech on the Internet without counting
each political communication as a contribution. 61 Therefore, cost-free Internet
communications do not require reporting because they are subject to a broad
“Internet exemption,” which the Commission intended to “make clear, appropriately so, that individuals and groups engaging in unfettered political discourse over the Internet using their own computer facilities or those publicly
available are not subject to regulation under the campaign finance laws.” 62 The
Internet freedom rules recognize that the Internet creates an open and level
playing field for all speakers because there are no dissemination costs for political commentary posted on Twitter, blogs, or YouTube. 63
58 See Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. at 18,602; see also 52 U.S.C. §
30104(f)(3)(A)(i); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a) (defining “electioneering communications” to include broadcast, cable, or satellite communications as subject to reporting or
disclaimer requirements); see also Statement of Reasons, Chairman Goodman & Comm’rs
Hunter & Petersen at 1, MUR 6729 (Checks and Balances) [hereinafter SOR, Chairman
Goodman & Comm’rs Hunter & Petersen, MUR 6729].
59 See 11 CFR §§ 100.94, 100.155 (establishing uncompensated Internet activity that is
not considered a contribution or expenditure, respectively).
60 See 52 U.S.C. § 30104.
61 See Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. at 18,602 (“The Commission agrees that
the Act does not require a disclaimer when a blogger or other person accepts payment from
a Federal candidate.”); see also GOODMAN, LAW AND ELECTION POLITICS, Supra note 10, at
58 (“The FEC concluded that individuals and groups of individuals should be free to engage
in voluntary and independent Internet speech and should be free to post electoral messages
on the Internet without counting such communications as quantifiable “contributions” or
“expenditures” subject to regulation”).
62 SOR, Chairman Goodman & Comm’rs Hunter & Petersen at 3, MUR 6729.
63 GOODMAN, LAW AND ELECTION POLITICS, Supra note 10, at 57 (“This deregulation
applies even to online postings that cost significant sums of money to produce. The production costs simply do not count as a regulated expenditure because the cost of public dissemination is free.”); see also Melissa Quinn, The Threat to Political Speech Online: Q&A With
Former Elections Chief Lee Goodman, THE DAILY SIGNAL (Jan. 3, 2015),
http://dailysignal.com/2015/01/03/future-political-speech-online-qa-fec-chairman-leegoodman/ (statement of Former FEC Chairman Goodman).
[E]ach video would have to carry a disclaimer at the bottom indicating who paid for
it and whether it was authorized by a political candidate. Second, BarelyPolitical.com would have to file expenditure reports with the Federal Election Commission disclosing the first date on which they post each YouTube video and how much
they spent on the production.
Id.
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Additionally, the 2006 regulations recognize the ubiquitous nature of costfree Internet speech content makes it almost impossible to regulate. 64 To enforce disclosure of every political comment posted online would require the
FEC to constantly troll Internet content to verify registrations or subpoena expenditure information from individual content generators. 65 Any failure of
comprehensive enforcement could support concerns of selective, politically
motivated enforcement. 66 Such a granular review of every Internet speaker
voicing his or her political comments would not be an efficient use of Commission resources. 67
Even if the FEC could design a workable review process for determining
how to identify violations, the same issues in calculating expenditures that existed prior to the 2006 rules would plague that process today. 68 Without the
Internet exemption, the FEC would have to evaluate each commenter’s ex64 Id. (statement of Former FEC Chairman Goodman) (“I cannot imagine how the Federal Election Commission will begin to regulate hundreds of thousands of blogs, YouTube
videos, chat rooms, emails and links, and all sorts of Internet-based political discussion because of how vast political discussion on the Internet currently is.”); Jamie Williams, Tell
the FEC Not to Amp Up Internet Regulations, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 12, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/tell-fec-not-amp-internet-regulations (“[W]e do not
have confidence that a politically appointed government board will be able to draw a line
that separates the individual blogger or YouTuber from deep-pocketed special interest
groups without damaging free speech.”).
65 Quinn, supra note 63 (statement of Former FEC Chairman Goodman).
[T]o establish an Internet review board where a room full of government bureaucrats
sit on a daily basis and troll the Internet for political commentary — to identify
online commentators who did not register or report their expenses in connection with
their website, and to issue subpoenas seeking information about their expenditures. I
know of no other way that the FEC could regulate the hundreds of thousands of
posts on the Internet, absent such a review process.
Id.
66 Hans A. von Spakovsky, The Heritage Found., Testimony before the Fed. Election
Comm’n
(Feb.
11,
2015)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2015/advance-notice-of-proposed-rulemakingon-aggregate-biennial-contribution-limits) (“[R]equiring…thousands of online bloggers,
websites, commenters, podcasters, and kitchen table journalists and reports
would…invariably lead to the charge of selective, politically motivated enforcement.”).
67 See Factual & Legal Analysis at 4, MUR 6795 (CREW) (“F&LA”).
68 Ronald D. Rotunda, Targeting Political Speech for the Next Election, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 4, 2014, at A19 (noting the former CFPPC Commissioner’s practical concerns for
calculating expenditures).
If someone’s tweet includes a hyperlink to a political website, what is the value that
this person must report? How does one deal with negative tweets—for example,
“you can’t believe what Joe’s website is advocating today”? Would there be disclosures if a candidate—or someone who engages in independent expenditures for or
against a candidate—later buys an advertisement on a blog, or increases blog traffic
by commenting on the blog?
Id.; see also EFF & CDT Comments at 2.

2015]

Don't Tread On Me...Online

189

penditures to include costs like software used to generate content, an Internet
connection, domain registration costs, or even the cost of a personal computer. 69
B. Testing the 2006 Rules
Chairwoman Ravel’s Statement of Reasons in Checks and Balances offered
few particulars on why free Internet content should be regulated differently. 70
In light of the visceral response to her current and prior efforts to regulate political Internet content, 71 it is unlikely that advanced details for a plan will be
released. 72 However, the trajectory of proposals to regulate Internet speech can
be gleaned from Chairwoman Ravel’s votes in recent matters before the Commission and her past record. In Checks and Balances, Ravel called on the
Commission to reevaluate the 2006 Internet communications policies based on
the general implication that changes in technology necessarily increase corruption, improper influence, 73 and produce a nefarious lack of transparency in the
democratic process. 74
69 See Advisory Op. 1998-22 (Leo Smith) at 2, 5 (“AO 1998-22”) (noting that a preInternet exemption existed that called for calculating expenditures based on actual costs
incurred by an individual to publish and maintain political website content).
70 SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 1, MUR 6729 (“Some of my colleagues seem to believe
that the same political message that would require disclosure if run on television should be
categorically exempt from the same requirements when placed on the internet alone.”).
71 See Rudy Takala, Federal Election Commission to Consider Regulating Online Polit(Feb.
11,
2015,
10:15
AM),
ical
Speech,
CNSNEWS.COM
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/rudy-takala/federal-election-commission-considerregulating-online-political-speech (noting the responses of Commissioners Goodman,
Hunter, and Peterson).
72 See Laurel Rosenhall, Ann Ravel Describes Backlash to Comments On Online Political Communication, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 22, 2014 7:07 AM),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article4053844.html (“Ravel
said the point she initially made in written comments late last month generated a storm of
backlash after Goodman did a television interview mischaracterizing her position”); see also
Letter from Ann M. Ravel, Fed. Election Comm’n Vice Chair, to Editor, Wall St. J. (Nov. 5,
2014) (declaring her Statement of Reasons in Checks and Balances had been mischaracterized); see also Stephen Spaulding (@SpauldingCC), TWITTER (Feb. 11, 2015, 8:21 AM),
https://twitter.com/SpauldingCC/status/565546214276743169 (“#FEC Chair @AnnMRavel
explains that there is no proposal to ‘regulate the internet’ vis-a-vis politics - to say otherwise is blatantly false”).
73 Compare SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 1-2, MUR 6729 (Checks and Balances) (“In doing so, the Commission turned a blind eye to the Internet’s growing force in the political
arena.”) with SOR, Chairman Goodman & Comm’rs. Hunter & Petersen at 5, MUR 6729
(“Regrettably, the 3-to-3 vote in this matter suggests a desire to retreat from these important
protections for online political speech – a shift in course that could threaten the continued
development of the Internet’s virtual free marketplace of political ideas and democratic
debate.”).
74 Ann M. Ravel, How Not to Enforce Campaign Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2014, at
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The FEC recently addressed the issue of political Internet activity independently conducted by individuals associated with campaigns or political
committees. 75 A complaint filed with the FEC alleged that an independent contractor to a political committee violated the FECA for failing to report a website he created to advocate the candidate he worked for. 76 The Commission
voted unanimously to dismiss the complaint, reasoning that the independent
contractor was not authorized to generate web communications on behalf of
the political committee. 77 Further, the Commission found that the total cost
associated with creating his site ($135), exceeded neither the threshold to qualify as political committee activity ($1,000), nor the independent expenditure
disclosure threshold ($250). 78
However, Commissioner Lee E. Goodman, then-Chairman of the FEC, emphasized in a Statement of Reasons accompanying the dismissal of that action,
that the Commission did not need to reach those threshold questions because of
the 2006 Internet freedom rules. 79 Goodman’s statement provided a clear legal
analysis of the Act and its derivative regulations that exclude uncompensated
services and cost-free Internet activity from the broader reporting requirements. 80 Goodman’s conclusion was that collateral affiliations to a campaign or
political committee do not alter an individual’s First Amendment right to engage in cost-free, independent speech posted on the Internet. 81
In December 2014, the Commission voted unanimously to dismiss another
A27 (“This transparency is vital to our democracy, and even more so after the Supreme
Court yesterday struck down aggregate limits on political contributions.”); see, e.g., Dave
Levinthal, New FEC Chief On ‘Dark Money’ Mission, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 17,
2014),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/12/17/16527/new-fec-chief-dark-moneymission (statement of Ann M. Ravel) (“Dark money is a broader problem...My passion is
transparency.”); M.D. Kittle, ‘Activist At Heart’ Ann Ravel Takes Gavel at FEC, WATCHDOG.ORG (Jan. 15, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://watchdog.org/193057/ann-ravel-fec-campaignfinance/ (statement of Ann M. Ravel) (“I understand that disclosure is a complicated topic
and that in some ways disclosure of small donors may not be significant because what we
want to know is who is influencing the elections so that we can make thoughtful decisions.”).
75 See Judson Berger, FEC Backs Off Flirtation With Regulating Internet,
FOXNEWS.COM (May 22, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/05/22/fec-backsoff-flirtation-with-regulating-internet/ (indicating that Chairwoman Ravel had backed a
motion to exclude “political activity on the internet” from any new regulations regarding
contribution limits).
76 MUR 6578 (Doug LaMalfa Committee, et al.), Compl. at 1, (May. 16, 2012).
77 Factual & Legal Analysis at 9-10, MUR 6578 (Doug LaMalfa Committee, et al.)
(“F&LA”).
78 Id.
79 Statement of Reasons, Chairman Goodman at 3-5, MUR 6578 (Doug LaMalfa Committee, et al.) [hereinafter SOR, Chairman Goodman, MUR 6578].
80 Id.
81 Id. at 7.
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complaint that alleged FECA violations stemming, in part, from Internet activities. 82 This complaint alleged that the Internet activities of CREW, a non-profit
group, including four press releases posted on the group’s website, an article
appearing on a blog, and a mass email soliciting donations based on advocacy
against a particular political candidate, violated the FECA for reporting failures. 83 Three commissioners found the 2006 Internet exemption did not apply,
but in this instance, it was inappropriate to dig into the minutia of dollars and
cents spent in the course of participating in political discussion online. 84
Chairwoman Ravel and two of her colleagues concluded that further information regarding the total cost of expenditures relating to these activities might
be available, but that an inquiry into such matters in this case would be an inefficient pursuit of the Commission’s purpose. 85 This type of subjective application of prosecutorial discretion is precisely what critics of regulating free political Internet content fear and which is eliminated by the Internet freedom
rules. 86
Concurring in the dismissal of the complaint against CREW, Commissioners Goodman and Caroline C. Hunter asserted the basis for applying the Internet exemption. 87 Their statement noted the alleged violation created by email
solicitations, posting press releases, and third party blog posting of CREW’s
messages, involved activities squarely within the 2006 regulation’s definition
of Internet activities. 88 The concurrence also acknowledged the record showed
no compensation paid to CREW for posting these political comments, 89 no
compensation paid by CREW to have its commentary posted, 90 and the associated expenditures reported for these activities did not reach the $1,000 threshold, 91 which would subject CREW to treatment as a political committee. 92
82 See Factual & Legal Analysis at 1-2, MUR 6795 (CREW) (“F&LA”) (showing that
the committee had decided not to pursue the complaint any further).
83 MUR 6795 (CREW), Compl. at 5 (Dec. 17, 2014).
84 See F&LA at 1, 4-5, MUR 6795 (identifying possible instances where the exception
most likely would not have applied while indicating that the commission had no intention to
prosecute the matter).
85 Statement of Reasons, Chair Ravel, Comm’rs Walther & Weintraub at 1-2, MUR
6795 (CREW) [hereinafter SOR, Chair Ravel, Comm’rs Walther & Weintraub, MUR 6795]
(stating the position that the nature of the low-cost communications involved, a nonexhaustive factual record, and efficiency, led the Commission to “exercise its prosecutorial
discretion to dismiss this matter.”).
86 See supra notes 72-73.
87 Statement of Reasons, Comm’rs Goodman & Hunter at 4, MUR 6795 (CREW) [hereinafter SOR, Comm’rs Goodman & Hunter, MUR 6795].
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 5-6.
91 Id. at 6-7.
92 See Id. at 6 (indicating that certain expenditures like administration fees, salary, production, and overhead were not counted toward the $1000 threshold for political committee
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The separate statements of reasons issued by the Commission present two
views on the regulation of political speech. On the one hand, an objective application of traditional anti-corruption goals to the Internet, and on the other, a
subjective enforcement of violations based on the prerogative of any fourperson majority at the time of the FEC’s review. The prospect of ad hoc enforcement by subjective review is especially alarming when considering what
some commissioners envision as the proper extent of regulated transparency.
C. If it Ain’t Broke, Why Fix It?
The motivation behind Chairwoman Ravel’s assessment that the relative
production quality of some political internet content demands increased reporting requirements, is informed by her work in California. 93 While serving as a
commissioner on the California Fair Political Practices Commission
(“CFPPC”), 94 Ravel’s belief that advancements in technology create de facto
impropriety in the democratic election process was evident when she pushed
for increased rules governing political content on blogs, Twitter, Facebook,
YouTube, and other websites. 95 The rules approved by CFPPC in 2013 and the
federal rules that require campaigns to disclose payments made for posting
political Internet content are essentially the same. 96 However, the rules Ravel
status).
93 See SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 2, MUR 6729 (“Since its inception, this effort to protect individual bloggers and online commentators has been stretched to cover slicklyproduced ads aired solely on the Internet but paid for by the same organizations and the
same large contributors as the actual ads aired on TV.”) (emphasis added).
94 Kittle, supra note 74 (statement of Ronald Rotunda, Former Commissioner of the
CFPPC) (“When she talks about ‘dark money’ what she’s really talking about is trying to
regulate the Internet, and she’s talked about it a lot.”); but see Rosenhall, supra note 72
(statement of Ann M. Ravel) (“[A]ll I said was, ‘We need to be informed by the technologists and others, and then talk about it.’ That got turned into my colleague saying on Fox
News that... I was trying to regulate the Internet.”).
95 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 18421.5 (2015) (stating that additional reporting must be
made to the public when a candidate or ballot measure pays for favorable or unfavorable
reporting on a blog site or social media); see also Patrick McGreevy, New California Rules
Aim for Transparency In Online Campaign Material, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-web-campaigns-20130920-story.html (indicating that
the purpose of this new regulation was to better inform the public and to allow the public to
evaluate the messages they receive on blogs and elsewhere online).
96 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 18421.5; Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. at
18,602; see also Reid Wilson, California Campaigns Must Report Paying Bloggers, WASH.
POST
(Sept.
20,
2013)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/09/20/california-campaigns-mustreport-paying-bloggers/ (emphasizing that payment for the opinion of a candidate or ballot
measure on a blog or social media not the nature of the opinion is essential for determining
whether it must be disclosed).

2015]

Don't Tread On Me...Online

193

proposed—which the CFPPC declined to adopt— are significant because they
would require bloggers to carry the reporting burden for posting compensated
political content. 97
Compensated content posted through any medium requires disclosure under
the law. 98 Imposing new regulations that create a shared burden of disclosure
for individuals that post free political content on the Internet would be a departure from both the 2006 FEC Internet exemption and traditional anti-corruption
campaign finance regulations. 99 Such a broad reaching enforcement system
creates substantial compliance burdens for individual Internet users. 100 In fact,
Chairwoman Ravel’s personal experiences with campaign contributions exemplify how difficult the implementation of dual-disclosure transparency can be
in practice. 101
97 See Patrick McGreevy, California ethics czar urges disclosure of payments to Web
pundits, L. A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2012) [hereinafter McGreevy, California Ethics Czar],
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/20/local/la-me-blogs-20120420 (explaining that a bloggers anonymity would not exclude them from the law requiring disclosure of payment); see
also Douglas McAlarney, Are Political Bloggers Weakening the Democratic Election Process by Being Paid to Give You Their “Unbiased” Opinions, 41 FLA. ST. U.L. REV 511,
533-34 (2014) (indicating that only one party—either the campaign or the blogger—is required to state that the blogger was paid to endorse or criticize a ballot measure or candidate); see also Wilson, supra note 96 (explaining that the rule passed by California’s state
watchdog committee required the reporting of campaigns paying for favorable touting or
slamming of a ballot or candidate).
98 See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101, 30104.
99 See Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. at 18,602 (“To require more of bloggers
when others who receive payments from campaigns are not subject to similar disclosure
requirements would not be fair.”); see also Quinn, supra note 63 (statement of Former FEC
Chairman Goodman).
If my organization wants to take out a banner ad or place an Internet video on a
commercial website and pay a fee for that advertising space, the FEC regulates that
expenditure just like it would a TV ad or radio ad. However, if an organization places content for free on the Internet, there is no expenditure to regulate because the
dissemination cost is free.
Id.
100 See Quinn, supra note 63.
We would have to have a regulation prescribing what is described in production
costs. The software that you purchased — and by the way, that goes for individual
bloggers, too — up to computer, the software you purchased, your monthly Internet
access charge. The FEC would have to get into this granular level of prescriptive
regulation to tell people what to include in their expenditure reports to the FEC.
Id.
101 See, e.g., Kittle, supra note 74 (discussing a 2006 campaign contribution made by
Chairwoman Ravel, for which disclosure reports listed Ann Miller, her maiden name, and
the generic profession of “attorney” was listed instead of her proper title of Santa Clara
County Counsel at the time. Conceding that it was legal, but nonetheless controversial, under Santa Clara laws for Ravel to simultaneously supply legal counsel to an incumbent
elected official while making financial contributions to his campaign opponent, Ravel maintains that the campaign was solely responsible for misattributing her contribution); see also
Robert Wilde, Erroneous Government Ethics Document Filed After FEC Chairman Ann
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New political speech regulations are unnecessary because the 2006 Internet
exemption established a fair and transparent forum for political speech. The
impractical enforcement issues created by new rules also show that the only
solution may be the current rules. 102 Recent enforcement votes and the call for
new regulations exhibit a refusal to acknowledge the proper scope of the 2006
Internet freedom rules. 103 However, the FEC’s ability to compel more disclosure on the Internet exemplifies a broader disagreement over the legal extent of
speech restrictions. 104
IV. THE FEC LACKS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO REGULATE FREE
INTERNET CONTENT
Without the current Internet freedom rules, Twitter, Facebook, blogs, chat
rooms, user-modified animated content like “Jib Jab,” and even the “Obama
Girl” videos on YouTube, would be subject to FEC reporting requirements. 105
Ravel Takes Lavish Weekend Trip, BREITBART.COM (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/02/11/ann-ravel-and-the-fec/ (highlighting a
disclosure error Ravel made to the Office of Government Ethics, incorrectly listing a twoday trip made in her capacity as Chairwoman, as a ten-day trip. Adding to the irony that the
chief watchdog for campaign finance disclosure compliance - and a self described champion
of transparency - erroneously filed an ethics document, is the fact that Ravel received a total
travel subsidy of $1,417.37 for the two-day trip; which included a rental car valued at $160
a day, roughly seven times the area average of $19-$25 per day, and which was paid for by
the California Political Attorney Association (“CPAA”) while one or more of the CPAA’s
attorneys were representing clients involved in hearings before the FEC).
102 von Spakovsky, supra note 66.
There is no question that requiring government registration and reporting by the
thousands of online bloggers, websites, commentators, podcasters, and kitchen table
journalists and reporters would not only burden their First Amendment right to speak
freely, but would be entirely impractical for the FEC. It simply does not have the resources or time to regulate such voluminous activity—it is unfeasible, and would invariably lead to the charge of selective, politically motivated enforcement.
Id.
103 SOR, Comm’rs Goodman & Hunter at 5, MUR 6795.
104 Jan Baran, Comment to Symposium: McCutcheon and the Future of Campaign Fi(Apr.
4,
2014
2:59
PM),
nance
Regulation,
SCOTUSBLOG
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/symposium-mccutcheon-and-the-future-of-campaignfinance-regulation (“[T]here are those who seek to minimize government intrusion into
political speech and those who believe considerable government regulation is necessary to
safeguard democracy and prevent corruption.”).
105 See Paul Bedard, Dems on FEC Move to Regulate Internet Campaigns, Blogs,
EXAMINER
(Oct.
24,
2014,
8:26
PM),
Drudge,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/dems-on-fec-move-to-regulate-internet-campaignsblogs-drudge/article/2555270 (“FEC Chairman Lee E. Goodman, a Republican, said if regulation extends that far, then anybody who writes a political blog, runs a politically active
news site or even chat room could be regulated. He added that funny internet campaigns like
“Obama Girl,” and “Jib Jab” would also face regulations.”).
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The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) as amended, charges
the Commission with administering compliance and enforcement as well as
formulating policies consistent with the Act. 106 The Act also explicates that
Congress’ authority supersedes the scope of the FEC’s authority to oversee any
aspect of federal elections. 107 The lower federal courts have repeatedly stated
that the FEC is an agency of limited jurisdiction without the authority to make
extra-statutory rules or assert a “roving plenary power” in the likeness of Congress. 108 Any new internet-related rule promulgated by the FEC must fit clearly
within the confines of the FECA, yet the October 2014 ANPRM on Aggregate
Biennial Contribution Limits suggest that the Commission would consider
modifying existing rules or adding new rules in response to McCutcheon. 109
Ironically, the text of the ANPRM cites language from the McCutcheon opinion that declares Congress as the proper authority to impose constitutionally
valid alternative measures to prevent circumvention. 110
A. The Statutory Media Exemption and the Advent of the Kitchen Table
Journalist
The Commissions’ broader definition of “Internet activity” and the Internet
exemption were born of out necessity and designed to reconcile a new communications medium while honoring First Amendment speech rights. The
“media exemption” is explicitly presented in the Act, 111 and wholly consistent
106 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) (“The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to, this Act and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of
Title 26. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions.”).
107 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit, restrict, or
diminish any investigatory, informational, oversight, supervisory, or disciplinary authority
or function of the Congress or any committee of the Congress with respect to elections for
Federal office.”)
108 The FEC is an agency of limited jurisdiction, and lacks any sort of roving plenary
power to pass extra-statutory rules. To the extent that other avenues of constitutional regulation exist, it is up to Congress- and Congress alone-to initiate such inquiries and collecting
cases where the courts have defined the limited jurisdiction of the FEC. See, e.g., EMILY’s
List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that for the FEC to have any power the money spent must be used for the “purpose” of influencing an election); see also, e.g., Unity’08
v. FEC, 596 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that draft groups are outside of the scope of
the FEC and therefore the FEC does not have the power to regulate); see also, e.g., FEC v.
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
109 Aggregate Biennial Contributions Limits, 79 Fed. Reg. at 62,362.
110 Id. (“Although it held the aggregate limits to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
indicated that there are multiple alternatives available to Congress that would serve the
Government’s interest in preventing circumvention while avoiding ‘unnecessary abridgment’ of First Amendment rights.”) (quoting McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1458) (internal
quotation omitted).
111 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(B)(i) (“The term ‘expenditure’ does not include—any news
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with First Amendment jurisprudence. 112 However, it remains unsettled as to
whether or not blogging and related social media activities qualify as journalism. 113 For now, blogging is generally considered exempt from the purview of
the FEC because it falls into either the Internet exemption or the “media exemption.” 114 Without the 2006 Internet freedom rules, the Commission would
have to determine if each blog with political commentary is subject to reporting and disclaimer requirements, or if it qualifies as a press entity subject to the
media exemption.
Regulating blogs as media creates a great challenge because the Internet has
effectively given a printing press to anyone with access to a computer. 115
Scores of political bloggers, commentators, podcasters, and independent journalists utilize the Internet from the comfort of their kitchen table. 116 Bloggers
story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station,
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or
controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate…”); see also 52 U.S.C. §
30104 (f)(3)(B)(i) (“The term ‘electioneering communication’ does not include a communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities
of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political
party, political committee, or candidate.”).
112 See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978) (emphasizing “the
special and constitutionally recognized role of that institution informing and educating the
public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate”); see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily
embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history
abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of
publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.
Id.
113 Compare Agnes Poirer, Blogging is Not Journalism, THE GUARDIAN, (Mar. 21, 2006,
5:43 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/mar/21/blogisnotjournalism
(contending that blogging is a habit and journalism is a profession that requires research)
with Robinson Meyer, U.S. Court: Bloggers Are Journalists: Even When They’re Libeling
ATLANTIC,
(Jan.
21,
2014,
11:45
AM),
You,
THE
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/01/us-court-bloggers-arejournalists/283225/ (explaining that bloggers are journalists when it comes to their first
amendment rights, and it is difficult to make a distinction between “journalists” that are
“media respondents” and “non –institutional respondents”).
114 See Internet Communications and Activity, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Jun. 2007),
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/internetcomm.shtml#press (“Whether covered by the
media exemption or the individual activity exemption, blogging will generally not be subject to FEC regulation.”).
115 See Quinn, supra note 63 (statement of Former FEC Commissioner Goodman) (“The
Internet has placed a printing press in the hands of every citizen in America. and many small
groups and individuals have started political commentary pages or websites on their kitchen
tables and have grown those blogs into being significant daily publications”).
116 von Spakovsky, supra note 66.
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and podcasters that focus on political content serve an indistinguishable purpose from the role of the press as the Supreme Court has defined it; bloggers
seek to inform and educate the public, offer criticism, and provide a forum for
discussion and debate. 117
To justify the view that these contributions to the discussion are inapposite
to the constitutionally protected role of the press, proponents of regulating
cost-free political Internet content rely on conjectures of the corruptibility of
bloggers. 118 Yet, the alleged undisclosed quid pro quo payments for favorable
blogging coverage would already violate the Act if they could be proved. 119
Publishing free Internet content that aims to influence political discussion presents no evidence of corruption as defined by the Act, therefore there is no basis for the FEC to regulate such content without universally rejecting the journalistic role of Internet commenters and obscuring the protections of the media
exemption.
The second justification for regulating blogs separately from traditional media relies on the false notion that any influence is an improper influence. 120 The
FECA includes no provision limiting the scope of a journalist’s influence, and
the Commission and the courts have repeatedly enforced the intent of Congress
that any and all forms of media enjoy the unfettered right to cover and comment on political campaigns. 121
117 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781 (“The press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally
recognized role of that institution in informing and educating the public, offering criticism,
and providing a forum for discussion and debate.”).
118 See Rotunda, supra note 68 (describing Ravel’s persistent allegations that “dark money” is influencing political Internet content, despite her inability to cite a single example
following CFPPC hearings that found no evidence to justify regulating bloggers potential
connections to policies or politicians they support); see also McAlarney, supra note 97, at
527-31 (leaving the question presented in the article’s title unanswered with mere suggestions and unconfirmed allegations that influential bloggers receive payment for favorable
coverage).
119 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)-(9).
120 See McGreevy, California Ethics Czar, supra note 97 (stating Ravel’s intent to regulate an anonymous blogger that “draws attention to criminal charges pending against Los
Angeles City Councilman Richard Alarcon”); see also McAlarney, supra note 97, at 533
(citing the opinion of founder and publisher of the Daily Kos, that left-leaning bloggers
were invited to a breakfast at the Democratic National Convention in order to get the party’s
message directly to its constituents and potential constituents).
121 Advisory Op. 2014-06, (Ryan for Congress) at 2-3 (“AO 2014-06”).
The legislative history of the media exemption indicates that Congress did not intend
to limit or burden in any way the First Amendment freedoms of the press and of association. The exemption assures the unfettered right of the newspapers, TV networks, and other media to cover and comment on political campaigns. Consistent
with the Act’s legislative history, the Commission and courts have recognized media
covered by the exemption to include magazines, newsletters, cartoons, cable television, the Internet, webcasts, satellite broadcasts, documentary films, radio talk
shows, and even rallies staged and broadcast by a radio talk show. The Commission
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It is unsurprising that certain Commissioners seek to regulate putative media
content on political blogs and podcasts given that three current FEC members
may not recognize the validity of the statutory press exemption at all. 122 A
complaint filed with the FEC during the 2012 elections alleged that a Boston
news station violated the Federal Election Campaign Act by making an illegal
campaign contribution equal to the amount of programming production costs,
when it invited two candidates to participate in a televised 30 minute debate
during regular Sunday morning news programming. 123 The complaint alleged
that the violation existed because the television broadcasting network, WCVB,
failed to invite a third-party candidate. 124 The Commission unanimously dismissed the complaint for lack of a violation, but there was no consensus in
their underlying analysis. 125 Three commissioners voted to dismiss the complaint based on an analysis of FEC regulations, including the objectiveness of
the television station’s criteria for limiting the debate. 126 The remaining three
commissioners issued a Statement of Reasons that confronted the complaint as
a jurisdictional matter, finding that the FEC did not have authority to regulate
editorial decisions made by journalists. 127 As a broadcasting television station,
has not limited the press exemption to traditional news outlets, but rather has applied
it to ‘news stories, commentaries, and editorials, no matter in what medium they are
published.
Id. (internal quotations, alterations and footnotes omitted).
122 See Certification at 1, MUR 6703 (WCVB-TV) (reflecting the votes of Commissioners Ravel, Walther, and Weintraub to disregard the press exemption in the Commission’s
analysis and conclusion that there was no FECA violation); see also Are FEC Commissioners Rethinking The Scope of the Media Exemption?, HOLTZMAN, VOGEL, JOSEFIAK, PLLC.,
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.hvjlaw.com/2011/01/are-fec-commissioners-rethinking-thescope-of-the-media-exemption/ (discussing the view of a law firm specializing in election
law and compliance on a 2011 FEC enforcement matter in which a TV and Radio personality solicited campaign contributions for a candidate by email. Commissioners Walther and
Weintraub, who remain on the Commission in 2015, voted to pursue enforcement of the
alleged violation because they did not find that the emails fell under the media exemption,
which allows media figures to solicit contributions).
123 MUR 6703 (WCVB-TV), Compl. at 2-3 (Nov. 28, 2012).
124 See id. (explaining that the channel that hosted the debate did nothing improper by
requiring a fundraising minimum to be in the debate, even though a third party candidate
had not reached that minimum); see also Goodman, Feds Flirt With TV, supra note 24 (discussing the Commission’s internal disagreement on this enforcement matter as symptomatic
of a larger debate on regulatory overreach).
125 See Certification at 1, MUR 6703 (WCVB-TV) (reflecting the votes of Commissioners Ravel, Walther, and Weintraub to disregard the press exemption in the Commission’s
analysis and conclusion that there was no FECA violation).
126 See Factual & Legal Analysis at 6, MUR 6703 (WCVB-TV) (“F&LA”) (indicating
that the commissioners did not believe that the criteria for the debate was done in a way to
purposely exclude one of the candidates).
127 See Statement of Reasons, Vice Chair Goodman, Comm’rs. Hunter & Petersen at 3-4,
MUR 6703 (WCVB-TV) [hereinafter SOR, Vice Chair Goodman, Comm’rs. Hunter & Pe-
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WCVB is a press entity by precedent and the plain language of the statute, and
the Act does “not define the issues permitted to be discussed or the format in
which they are to be presented under the ‘commentary’ exemption nor do they
set a time limit as to the length of the commentary.” 128
If the journalistic contributions of political content on the Internet are
properly recognized within the media exemption, the Supreme Court’s statement that “[t]here is simply no support for the view that the First Amendment,
as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by
media corporations,” should protect the journalistic commentary of bloggers
and podcasters. 129 The distinctions barring regulation of format and content
noted in the Vice Chair’s WCVB statement 130 are logically applicable to blogging or podcasting political Internet content, where myriad forms and issue
focuses are posted at the editorial discretion of the commenter. Thus, to review
Internet political commentary on the merits of its content and format is a complete disregard for the statutory protection of the role of the media as provided
by the Act.
B. The Quid Pro Quo Corruption Defined by the Act does Not Exist in Pure
Political Speech
The Commission’s authority does not extend to policing the vast cost-free
forum of political discussion on the Internet. 131 Rather, the FEC’s statutory authority is limited to preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of
corruption. 132 Within the Act’s definitions, “independent expenditure[s]” subtersen, MUR 6703] (stating that some commissioners believed they should not take on the
issue due to the FEC’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
128 See id. at 4 (explaining that the press is within its rights to use a debate format to
convey information to the public).
129 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353; see Freedom Partners Chamber of Commerce &
Freedom Partners Action Fund, Comment Letter on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits at 12 (Jan. 15, 2015), [hereinafter FPCC &
FPAF Comments], http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=313005 (“Ultimately, the
so-called ‘media exemption’ is not simply a statutory carve out, provided simply by the
benevolence of Congress.”).
130 See SOR, Vice Chair Goodman, Comm’rs. Hunter & Peterson at 3-4, MUR 6703
(discussing how Commissioners Hunter and Peterson believed that the FEC has no legal
authority to “regulate the editorial decisions of journalist”).
131 Cf. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963) (“Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.” (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 311 (1940)).
132 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (“Limits on independent expenditures…have a
chilling effect extending well beyond the Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo
corruption. The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here in question.”).
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ject to reporting are those made by an individual that expressly advocate “the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and that [are] not made in
concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate,
the candidate’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political
party committee or its agents.” 133 Therefore, mere allegations of issue advocacy, coverage that is favorable to a particular candidate by a putative Internet
press entity, or a Commissioner’s relative assessments of “slickly-produced
ads,” 134 are not sufficient for the FEC to assert its authority without a showing
of quid pro quo corruption. 135
According to proponents of regulating free political Internet content, such
corruption exists where unreported contributions and expenditures are made in
exchange for control over political Internet content. 136 Yet—despite these arguments—even if contributions and expenditures made by political committees
and campaigns could have the ability to create pervasive influence across political Internet content, the Act provides the proper scope of the FEC’s authority
to regulate such conduct. 137 Under the Act’s provisions, independent expenditures that exceed $250 require an expenditure report by any individual that is
not a political committee. 138 This means the Commission is congressionally
authorized to oversee political Internet commentary by individuals who spend
more than $250 to expressly advocate a candidate. Whether the $250 threshold
is consistent with constitutional jurisprudence that calls for scrutiny of “large
contributions” for the impact they may have in receiving return action in kind

52 U.S.C. § 30101(17).
See SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 2, MUR 6729 (indicating the Internet is a major source
of political funding and has become the home of slickly produced political ads).
135 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that
interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”); see also Davis, 554 U.S. at 741 (stating in
an opinion that also struck the disclosure requirements of the so-called “Millionaires
Amendment,” the Court held that “[p]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption
are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting
campaign finances.”) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
136 Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Loophole.com: How the FEC’s Failure to Fully Regulate
the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1732-40
(2009).
137 See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1) (“Every person (other than a political committee) who
makes independent expenditures in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $250 during a
calendar year shall file a statement containing the information required under subsection
(b)(3)(A) for all contributions received by such person.”); See also 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(A)
(“any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year”).
138 See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1).
133
134
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is a separate issue. 139 Nonetheless, the Act is clear: if an individual spends less
than $250 to advocate, criticize, or comment on a political candidate, the FEC
has no authority to regulate that individual’s conduct.
Without going full circle to the analysis which produced the Internet exemption, it suffices to say that any accounting evaluation of expenditures related to
posting political Internet content, i.e. the de minimis costs of using YouTube,
creating a blog, Tweeting, or even procuring Internet access would strain to
reach the $250 bar in 2015. 140 Assuming arguendo that in 2015 individuals
have free access to computers and the Internet as a result of unrelated needs or
through public access, the FEC lacks authority to regulate activity for which an
individual incurs no cost. 141 If the Commission expanded its cost analysis to
include the purchase of a home computer, the table the commenter sits at, or
the coffee she drinks while posting at all hours of the night, these line items
would be wholly inconsistent with the Act’s purpose of ferreting out large contributions prone to garner an in-kind response from political candidates. 142 Further, such analysis would break with the Commission’s own interpretation of
the Act over the last twenty years to include “personal volunteer activity” as
exempt from regulation. 143
The FEC was created to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption
in the democratic election process. 144 The Commission’s statutory mandate is
139 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (“To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our
system of representative democracy is undermined.”).
140 See F&LA at 9, MUR 6578 (showing that the cost of creating a website did not come
to the $250 minimum threshold for being required to be disclosed); see also AO 1998-22, at
5 (accounting an individual’s costs related to publishing an unauthorized candidate advocacy website as less than $250).
141 See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17) (“The term “independent expenditure” means an expenditure by a person…” (emphasis added); see also SOR, Comm’rs. Goodman & Hunter at 5 n.
21, MUR 6795 (“For there to be an “independent expenditure” there must be an “expenditure” as defined by the Act and Commission regulations.”).
142 EFF & CDT Comments at 1, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits (“Unlike political advertisements in the offline world, the Internet is not merely a tool of the wealthy political elite. Ordinary individuals can purchase Internet ads, create YouTube videos, and post
banners on their personal websites to express support for particular candidates or parties—
all for little or no cost.”).
143 See Advisory Op. 1999-17 (George W. Bush for President) at 5 (“AO 1999-17”); see
also 11 C.F.R §§ 100.74, 100.75, 100.79 (addressing individual volunteer contributions of
time and the resources of homes and vehicles as exempt).
144 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26; see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (providing a now abrogated
governmental interest in preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas,” that is
nevertheless wholly inapplicable to restricting individual political commentary on the Internet).
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not—and has never been—to regulate speech for the sake of regulating
speech. 145 Contributing to the political discussion by posting commentary on
the Internet for free represents pure speech that is unquestionably protected by
the First Amendment and uninhibited by the provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act. To regulate free Internet content because it involves political
commentary is outside of the FEC’s authority, and any statutory provision that
called for the FEC to compel disclosure and disclaimer of pure speech would
violate the Constitution.
V. REGULATING PURE SPEECH CONTENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA AND
BLOGS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Calls to regulate political content on the Internet and the Commission’s Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on McCutcheon’s abrogation of biennial campaign contribution limits are not coincidental. 146 The underlying premise
of expanding campaign finance regulations is that financial resources are inherently corruptive and must be restricted wherever money may be present. 147
This premise was rejected by McCutcheon, which emphasized that mere conjecture is inadequate to carry a First Amendment burden. 148 The flaws of this
premise are typically exposed by the specific identification of a particular
group or viewpoint and the assumption that financial resources spent advocating that viewpoint, are alone, evidence of corruption outside the protections of
the First Amendment. 149 The risks of accepting this premise in the context of
145 See Goodman, Online Political Opinions, supra note 5 (“[T]he FEC has no authority
to regulate political speech for the sake of limiting speech, but only with regard to large
monetary contributions and expenditures with corruptive potential.”).
146 See Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits, 79 Fed. Reg. at 62,361; see also SOR,
Vice Chair Ravel at 2, MUR 6729.
147 Compare SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 2, MUR 6729 (“[the Internet is] a major source
of political advertising — dominated by the same political organizations that dominate traditional media.”); with Rotunda, supra note 68.
The theory behind limiting political campaign contributions is the fear that a contributor might secure special access to an officeholder or secure his, or his successor’s, secret promise to vote for or against a piece of legislation. This fear does not
apply when someone is arguing publicly for or against a law, regardless of who may
or may not have paid him to do so.
Id.
148 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (“[W]e ‘have never accepted mere conjecture as
adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.’” (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000))).
149 Compare Levinthal, supra note 74 (statement of Ann M. Ravel on the issues of reporting and disclaimers) (“Dark money is a broader problem”), and Ann M. Ravel
29,
2014,
7:51
AM),
(@AnnMRavel), TWITTER (Jan.
https://twitter.com/AnnMRavel/status/560827579486044162 (citing social media post by
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an Internet speech rule arise from discretionary applications of the rule on a
selective and highly partisan basis. 150
The fundamental right of free speech is imperiled most where the government attempts to restrict speech purely on the basis of what is said and who
says it. 151 As the Supreme Court recently recognized, disagreement with the
content of political speech is irrelevant to speech rights. 152 The laws and regulations of campaign finance do not authorize the censorship of some to the benefit of others. 153 Stated differently, the FEC cannot enforce bare censorship because the government is not endowed to moderate the people’s discussion of
government. 154
Would-be Internet speech regulators know this, and so they recast their interest as an effort to prevent corruption, but without consideration of the limiting principles recognized since Buckley. 155 Chairwoman Ravel’s statement in
Checks and Balances displayed her concern for “the Internet’s growing force

Chairwoman Ravel linking a story titled “How Dark Money Flows through the Koch Network”), with Kittle, supra note 74 (statement of Ronald Rotunda, Former Commissioner of
the CFPPC) (“[W]hen she talks about ‘dark money’ what she’s really talking about is trying
to regulate the Internet, and she’s talked about it a lot.”).
150 See Chuck Ross, FEC Democrats Opposed Republican’s Appeal But Supported
Democrats’,
THE
DAILY
CALLER
(Feb.
11,
2015
10:31
AM),
http://dailycaller.com/2015/02/11/fec-democrat-opposed-republicans-appeal-but-supporteddemocrats/; see also Goodman, Feds Flirt With TV, supra note 24 (describing recent examples of partisan enforcement application by the Commission over the past several years).
151 Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340-41 (“As instruments to censor, these categories
are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often
simply a means to control content. . .[but] [t]he First Amendment protects speech and
speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.”); see also CHAIRMAN DARRELL ISSA, STAFF
REPORT, H COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, HOW POLITICS LED THE IRS TO
TARGET CONSERVATIVE TAX-EXEMPT APPLICANTS FOR THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS 2 (2014),
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/How-Politics-Led-to-the-IRSTargeting-Staff-Report-6.16.14.pdf (“Freedom of speech . . . [is a right] so fundamental to
American citizens that [it is] enshrined in the First Amendment of the Constitution’s Bill of
Rights (citation omitted).”).
152 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (“Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.” (citing Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 784 (1978))).
153 Id.
154 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.12 (“speech concerning public affairs is more than
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government” (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964))).
155 See Lachlan Markay, FEC Republicans Vow to Fight Regulations on Online Political
Speech, WASH. FREE BEACON (Oct. 28, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://freebeacon.com/issues/fecrepublicans-vow-to-fight-regulations-on-online-political-speech (statement of FEC Commissioner Goodman) (“The problem is that Ravel’s approach to the issue contains “no limiting principle. . . In attempting to crack down on those “slickly-produced ads,” the FEC
could ensnare countless Internet users who simply communicate their political views
online.”).
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in the political arena.” 156 Although Chairwoman Ravel’s voting record reflects
an interpretation that rejects the FEC’s Internet and Media exemptions, 157 the
explicit rejection of McCutcheon in her statement cannot be dismissed as mere
interpretation. 158 That political Internet commentary might influence elections
or elected officials is not a sufficient governmental interest to impinge upon a
constitutional right. 159
Exercising pure speech at de minimis cost on the Internet presents no discernible threat as an “effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official
duties.” 160 The projected corruption alleged by the influence of the Internet is
uncorroborated by any evidence recorded by the FEC that the existing laws are
inadequate, being circumvented, or that substantial compliance issues exist. 161
Absent evidence of this perceived or imagined corruption, the unlimited pursuit preventing influence as de facto corruption of elected officials and candidates has no constitutional basis.
Forcing disclosure of Internet-based political speech would also create substantial burdens to speakers, and therefore reduce speech. 162 The Buckley Court
156 SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 1-2, MUR 6729 (“[T]he Commission turned a blind eye to
the Internet’s growing force in the political arena.”).
157 See, e.g., Lee Goodman, The FEC’s Problems Aren’t with the GOP, POLITICO (May
10, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/the-fecs-problems-arent-withthe-gop-117798.html#.Vd-7MPlViko (citing instances of FEC Chairwoman Ann Ravel’s
recent voting history within the Commission).
158 David A. Graham, What Use Are Campaign-Finance Laws If They’re Not Enforced?,
THE ATLANTIC (May 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/whatuse-are-campaign-finance-laws-if-theyre-not-enforced/392621/.
159 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450-51.
Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection
with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties, does not
give rise to such quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual
who spends large sums may garner “influence over or access to” elected officials or
political parties … the Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access.
Id.
160 Id. at 1450.
161 von Spakovsky, supra note 66.
There is no evidence in the record that the current regulations are inadequate, that
they are being circumvented, or that there are substantial problems with noncompliance. Without such evidence, any changes in the applicable regulations, particularly
any further limiting of constitutionally protected political activity would be arbitrary
and capricious, a clear and obvious violation of the Chevron standard.
Id.
162 Id.
It would create a huge group of violators who would have no idea that there was a
reporting requirement, much less how to do it correctly. Such regulation could end
up “seriously restricting participation in the democratic process,” something the Supreme Court warned against in McCutcheon. It would raise the dire specter of a fed-
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recognized the significant deterrent effect of compelled disclosure as the basis
for requiring strict scrutiny where First Amendment rights are at risk. 163 In Davis v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court restated its recognition
of the significant consequences compelled disclosure have on privacy of association and belief. 164 Expanding Internet speech restrictions would require individuals to consider legal consequences, if not obtain counsel, before posting
political commentary on social media. 165 The desire to voice a political opinion
would suddenly be strangled by the uncertainty of a commenter’s obligations
and the fear of serious legal repercussions. 166
Political speech regulations would also benefit wealthy donors, because they
have the resources to establish tax-exempt 501(c) and 527 organizations. 167
Creating a non-profit entity to provide political advocacy is a daunting task and
requires overcoming a significant barrier to the plain exercise of the First
Amendment. 168 It is hard to imagine George Soros, Michael Bloomberg, or
Sheldon Adelson vigorously typing away on their Twitter feed, “liking” a Facebook post, or having the inclination to make the “Obama Girl” YouTube
video. But average citizens do participate in the political discussion in those

Id.

eral agency monitoring everything that is being said on the Internet, something that
should scare every American (footnote omitted).

163 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65 (“[E]ven if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action, but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct in requiring disclosure.” (citing
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 461)).
164 Davis, 554 U.S. at 727 (“[C]ompelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on
privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment” (quoting Buckley,
424 U.S. at 64)).
165 Coolidge-Reagan Found. & Conservative Action Fund, Comment Letter on Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits at 9
(Jan. 15. 2015), [hereinafter CRF & CAF Comments] (“Ordinary citizens would have to
pore over technical regulations, consult with a specialized campaign finance attorney, or
seek an advisory opinion from the FEC to determine whether their social media updates,
blog postings, e-mails, or websites are legal, contain any necessary disclaimers, or trigger
any additional disclosure requirements.”); cf., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 324. (“The First
Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney .
. . before discussing the most salient political issues of our day.”).
166 See e.g., Goodman, Feds Flirt With TV, supra note 24 (describing the penalties for
violating corporate contribution regulations, “people who make them face stiff fines, injunctions, and can even go to prison”).
167 See generally GREG J. SCOTT & ZAINAB S. SMITH, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEC CAMPAIGN
GUIDE:
POLITICAL
PARTY
COMMITTEES
(2013),
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/partygui.pdf#search=501%20c.
168 See Jill Havlat, How Much Money Do You Need to Start a Nonprofit, NONPROFIT HUB,
http://www.nonprofithub.org/starting-a-nonprofit/how-much-money-do-you-need-to-start-anonprofit/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2015) (explaining the process of setting up a nonprofit and
the filing fees that are involved.).
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ways. 169 Creating a barrier that enhances the speech of one segment of society
by restricting others has been has roundly rejected by the Supreme Court. 170
Additionally, restricting political Internet speech would shine a substantial
light onto the personal lives of political Internet commenters. McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission announced the importance of anonymity inherent in the
First Amendment, going so far as to assign it the “honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent…a shield from the tyranny of the majority.” 171 Disclosure requirements would subject individuals to revealing their telephone number and
address without a scintilla of corruption implicated by the desire to voice a
political opinion online. 172 Therefore, increased regulation of political Internet
activity is certain to cause less political Internet activity, 173 and as Justice Kennedy wrote in Citizens United, “political speech must prevail against the laws
that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.” 174 The Internet demands exactly the breathing room the Court referenced in NAACP v. Button,
169 See Daniela V. Dimitrova et al., The Effects Of Digital Media On Political
Knowledge And Participation In Election Campaigns: Evidence From Panel Data, 41
COMM. RES. 95, 96-97 (2014) (discussing the growth of social media in recent years and the
importance that candidates utilize these tools to reach potential voters.).
170 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (“[The] concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment.”).
171 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a
shield from the tyranny of the majority…It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the
Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.
Id.; contra, John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 221 (2010) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“Our
Nation’s longstanding traditions of legislating and voting in public refute the claim that the
First Amendment accords a right to anonymity in the performance of an act with governmental effect.”).
172 EFF & CDT Comments at 2, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits (“The Commission should not force individuals to disclose sensitive personal information—such as an
address or telephone number—without a clear need for the information in order to address
an overt threat to the integrity of the campaign finance system.”).
173 See CRF & CAF Comments at 10, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits (“Mechanistically applying twentieth-century standards for paper, radio, and television communications to this fundamentally different medium threatens to strangle this crucial channel for
political discourse, chill a tremendous amount of political speech by ordinary Americans.”);
see also Quinn, supra note 63.
The specter of regulation of Internet political speech will discourage small groups
and individuals from using the Internet to express their political opinions. If we regulate it, we will necessarily discourage it and get less of it. It’s an axiom that if you
regulate it, you will deter it and get less of it.
Id.
174 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 312.
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and established by current FEC regulations. 175 The prospect of regulating free
political Internet content does not overcome even statutory construction, let
alone show a compelling government interest required by strict scrutiny. 176
VI. TILTING AT WINDMILLS: THE FALSE PREMISE OF THE
GOVERNING CLASS ENGENDERS FEAR TO INCREASE THEIR OWN
AUTHORITY
The contradiction of regulating speech through money is that increasing the
authority of regulators—especially unelected regulators—effectively creates an
imbalance of influence to favor political speakers with the greatest resources.
By imposing limits on all speech, individual speakers face greater costs and
barriers to freely voicing opinions, while speakers with substantial resources
maintain the necessary influence to steer the expanded bureaucratic authority
or to afford the legal mechanisms of efficient compliance. This imbalance is
amplified by the incentive of those in power to dictate the rules of the democratic contest in their own favor. 177
A. Engendering Fear with The Corruption Windmill
Controlling speech by regulating free political Internet content has been observed as a “solution in search of a problem.” 178 The accusation that dark mon175 See EFF & CDT Comments at 2, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits (“Political
speech on the Internet demands substantial breathing space to ensure robust online debate.
The Commission’s current—and narrow—regulatory approach provides such breathing
space and thereby ensures that campaign finance laws do not chill the online speech of the
millions of ordinary people who communicate about politics online.”).
176 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (“Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can
demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.” (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S., at
395)).
177 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“No man is allowed to be a judge in his
own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity.”).
178 FPCC & FPAF Comments at 3, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits (“Equally
troubling is the disingenuousness in the presentation of amounts spent in connection with
elections, presumably to create a “problem” in need of a “solution.”); see also Adam B,
California Starts Regulating Political Blogging. Why?, DAILY KOS (Sept. 20, 2013, 9:34
AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/09/20/1240155/-California-starts-regulatingpolitical-blogging-Why.
What, exactly, is the problem that this is intended to solve? Has California state and
local politics been overrun by covert, deceptive online activity? Are citizens bamboozled on a regular basis?... But it’s still a solution in search of a problem. There
are a lot of issues dealing with the role of money in politics which legislators and
regulators ought to be addressing, with the goal of reducing the corrupting influence
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ey and political speech expenditures corrupt democracy are not unique to the
Internet. President Obama incorrectly predicted in his 2010 State of the Union
address that a stampede of money would flood elections after Citizens United. 179 Chairwoman Ravel likewise misrepresents reality by alleging that dark
money is flooding the political arena on the Internet. 180 The view that the money and influence of political organizations and large contributors represents
quid pro quo corruption on traditional media and the Internet is factually incorrect. 181 Further, this claim has no standing as a violation of the First Amendment. 182
According to the FEC, roughly $7 billion dollars was spent toward the 2012
election cycle 183 and nearly $4 billion was spent in 2014. 184 But the underlying
numbers tell a different, more important story about the influence of anonymous donations. In 2012, only $300 million of the $7 billion was spent by nonprofit organizations. 185 Much like individuals who currently post free political

Id.

of amassed wealth on elections. This wasn’t one of them.

179 Baran, supra note 104 (“In his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama
personally lectured members of the Court and predicted a “stampede” of money resulting
from that decision…The amount of money spent in subsequent elections rose, although at a
rate no higher than in preceding elections.”).
180 Levinthal, supra note 74 (statement of FEC Vice Chair Ann Ravel) (“Dark money is
a broader problem…It’s not a partisan question for me.”).
181 SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 2, MUR 6729.
But the Commission failed to take into account clear indicators that the Internet
would become a major source of political advertising – dominated by the same political organizations that dominate traditional media. Since its inception, this effort to
protect individual bloggers and online commenters has been stretched to cover slickly produced ads aired solely on the Internet but paid for by the same organizations
and the same large contributors as the actual ads aired on TV.
Id.
182 United States v. Int’l Union United Auto. Aircraft & Agr. Implement Workers of
Am., 352 U.S 567, 597 (1957) (“Some may think that one group or another should not express its views in an election because it is too powerful, because it advocates unpopular
ideas, or because it has a record of lawless action. But these are not justifications for withholding First Amendment rights from any group.”).
183 Tarini Parti, $7 Billion Spent On 2012 Campaign, FEC says, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2013,
10:26 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/7-billion-spent-on-2012-campaign-fecsays-87051.html.
184 Estimated
Cost
of
Election
2014,
OPEN
SECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/cost.php (last visited Aug. 26, 2015); see also 2014
Election Overview, OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/ (last visited Aug.
26, 2015); see also Parti, supra note 183 (each election becomes more expensive than the
next, the total spent in the 2012 election was greater than the number of people on the planet
– totaling about $7 billion spent by candidates, parties, and outside groups.).
185 Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the
2011-2012
Election
Cycle
(Apr.
19,
2013),
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/pdf/20130419release.pdf; see also FPCC & FPAF
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Internet content, these non-profits are not obligated to disclose their donors and
members. 186 This means that the rampant corruption and evils of “dark money,”
so often touted by “activists” like Chairwoman Ravel, accounted for roughly
4% of all contributions made during the 2012 presidential election.
These donations are distinct from pure speech posted online in that they do
carry a “paid for by” disclaimer, but it does not change their comparative diminution among overall political expenditures. 187 A non-partisan study published
in July 2014, found that states with aggregate or proportional contribution limits were arguably more corrupt than states without such limits. 188 Restricting
cost-free political speech on the Internet and aggregate limits share a regulatory motivation, which is mislabeling political speech through money as corruption. 189 The existence of corruption justifiably stirs up public concern and provides regulators a reason to expand their own authority. Expanded authority
allows those already in power to retain power and, ultimately, it allows those
governing to limit the speech of the governed. 190
Despite claims that individual voters are voraciously researching candidates
and issues online in desperate reliance on unbiased facts to inform their vote, 191
Comments at 3, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits.
186 Don Kramer, Is a Nonprofit Required to Report Anonymous Donors to the IRS?,
NONPROFIT ISSUES, (June 14, 2011), http://www.nonprofitissues.com/to-the-point/nonprofitrequired-report-anonymous-donors-irs.
187 FPCC & FPAF Comments at 3, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits.
188 Matt Nese, Aggregate and Proportional Limits in the States: Have they Reduced Corruption or Promoted Better Government?, ISSUE ANALYSIS no. 9, July 2014, at 3,
http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/2014-07-08_Issue-Analysis9_Aggregate-And-Proportional-Limits-In-The-States-Have-They-Reduced-Corruption-OrPromoted-Better-Government.pdf.
189 Id. at 1.
190 Hearing on S.J. Res. 19 Before The S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1 (2014)
[hereinafter Hearing on S.J. Res. 19] (statement of Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill, Gordon
& Reindel, LLP)
The description of the constitutional amendment [S.J. Res. 19] proposes states, in its
text, that it “relate[s] to contributions and expenditures intended to affect elections.”
That’s one way to say it, but I think it would have been more revealing to have said
that it actually “relate[s] to speech intended to affect elections.” And it would have
been even more revealing, and at least as accurate, to have said that it relates to limiting speech intended to affect elections. And that’s the core problem with it. It is intended to limit speech about elections and it would do just that.
Id.
191 McAlarney, supra note 97, at 526 (relying on a single allegation of an unexecuted
contract which provided a bonus for a blogger in Florida, if the blogger’s negative stories
about the candidate did not appear in the top thirty search results).
Before voting, many people will conduct an Internet search using the name of a
candidate for office utilizing a search engine, such as Yahoo! Or Google. The search
engine produces several website links regarding the candidate. The results will produce the good, the bad, and the ugly stories. The goal of the paid political blogger is
to crowd out the good stories listed in Internet search engine results and knock the
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most individuals get their news and political information from sources that
agree with a particular perspective. 192 This means conservatives watch Fox
News and listen to Mark Levin, and liberals get their news from MSNBC and
listen to their local NPR Station. 193 Just as impassioned partisan rants excite
the homogenous demographics of these TV and radio shows, engendering fears
of corruption is advantageous to regulators because it creates a sense of necessity for increased regulations. The intrusion of overreaching regulations upon
interactions that would otherwise be sorted between the interested parties is the
lifeblood of the bureaucratic administrative state. 194 If there is no identifiable
need for third party government intervention—whether that need is efficiency,
corruption, or resource allocation—there is no need for regulators. Following
the precedent of Buckley, the rallying cry of regulatory overreach in the area of
campaign finance is “corruption!” 195
By the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement, the Bill of Rights exists out of
general distrust for government. 196 But the people’s distrust of government can
be manipulated by offering governmental remedies to nonexistent problems.
Fear that a majority or opposing political view is advanced by corruption provides a demand for regulators to protect the voice of the minority. The most
effective method of depriving the constitutional authority of people is to increase the people’s reliance on government. This unconstitutional shift of power is achieved by incrementally enacting laws and regulations that expand the
authority of the governing class.

Id.

good stories off the first page of results and replace them with negative stories.).

AMY MITCHELL & RACHEL WEISEL, PEW RES. CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION & MEHABITS 1 (2014), http://www.journalism.org/files/2014/10/Political-Polarization-andMedia-Habits-FINAL-REPORT-7-27-15.pdf (“[T]he study finds that those with the most
consistent ideological views on the left and the right have information streams that are very
distinct from each other and from those of individuals with more mixed political views.”).
193 Id.; see also Aaron Smith, Senior Researcher, Pew Res. Ctr., Pew Research Findings
on Politics and advocacy in the social media era 43 (Jul. 29, 2014), (presentation slides
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/07/PAC-Aaron-Smith-Presentation.pdf).
194 Robert
Higgs, Government Growth, LIBRARY OF ECON. AND LIBERTY,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GovernmentGrowth.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2015),
(“Superimposed on the century-long trend to bigger government—measured by size, scope,
and power—are several episodes of extraordinarily rapid growth associated with crises,
especially the two world wars and the Great Depression.”).
195 Doug Kendall & Tom Donelly, Citizens United, President Obama, and His Liberal
Naysayers, HUFF. POST (Jan. 2, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dougkendall/citizens-united-president_b_2064049.html.
196 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (“Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the
First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints, and
prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by
some but not others.”).
192

DIA
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B. Expanding the Role of Regulators
Our constitutional democracy has evolved and expanded in such a way that
government is no longer a neutral independent party. 197 Rather, it is what the
anti-Federalists feared: a government that grants itself authority to dictate the
rights of the people. 198 The Federal Register lists 435 federal agencies that are
authorized to regulate the administrative state. 199 Among these agencies, the
FEC received 81,600 filed documents in 2013. 200 In that same year, the Commission closed 134 enforcement matters and settled 39 Alternative Dispute
Resolutions for a total of roughly $770,000 in civil penalties. 201 Over a 13 year
period beginning in 2000, the FEC reviewed 2,623 compliance matters and
assessed roughly $375,000 in Administrative Fines per year for late or nonfiling disclosure compliance. 202 If the reach of the FEC’s authority is expanded
to include free political Internet content, this figure would exponentially increase.
Data from the Pew Research Center shows that roughly 87% of Americans,
or 277,405,638 people, use the Internet. 203 Of this group, 74%, or roughly 205
million individuals, use social media, 204 and political activity is high among
social media users; of this group 38% like or promote political content; 35%
encourage others to vote; 34% post their own comments on politics; 33% repost others’ political content; 31% encourage others to take action; 28% post
links to political articles; 21% belong to a political group; and 20% follow
candidates or elected officials. 205 At the very minimum level of political partic197 Dan Mitchell, America’s Ever-Expanding Regulatory Swamp, UNITED LIBERTY (Sept.
4, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.unitedliberty.org/articles/18582-america-s-ever-expandingregulatory-swamp (analyzing statistics on the broad impact of regulations on employment,
economics and the associated costs needed to sustain them).
198 The Brutus No. 1; but see ANN WARD & LEE WARD, THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO FEDERALISM (Ann Ward & Lee Ward, 2009).
199 Agency List, OFF. OF THE FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies (last
visited Mar. 14, 2015).
200 FED. ELECTION COMM’N, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR
2013,
at
iii,
14
(2013),
http://www.fec.gov/pages/budget/fy2013/FEC_Final_PAR_2013_121613.pdf.
201 Id. at 23 (assessing $730,390 in civil penalties from enforcement matters and $36,850
from Alternative Dispute Resolution).
202 See id.
203 MAEVE DUGGAN ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2014, at 2 (2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/01/PI_SocialMediaUpdate20144.pdf;
cf.
USA
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Aug.
5,
2015,
8:59
AM),
QuickFacts,
U.S.
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.
204 Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
205 Smith, supra note 193, at 25.
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ipation online, this means that more than 4 million individuals would now be
subject to the FEC’s review. 206 The supposed goal of these potential regulations is to prevent corruption in free Internet content, but it would monumentally expand the FEC’s authority into the homes of millions of Americans.
C. The Ultimate Winners of Political Speech Restrictions are Incumbent
Politicians
Limitations that restrict the quantity and content of political speech benefit
incumbent office holders because these individuals are known to the public,
more able to raise money, and are able to use the stature of their offices for
self-promotion through legislative initiatives and news coverage. 207 Not satisfied with the benefits of incumbency, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (commonly known as McCain-Feingold)208 attempted to “level electoral
opportunities” 209 based on the personal wealth of candidates. The Court in Davis struck this measure for impermissibly granting Congress the authority held
by the voters. 210 Similarly, the speech limitations struck down by McCutcheon,
were the result of Congress’ attempt to divine the amount of money and the
number of candidates an individual could donate to before corruption arose. 211
Prior to the Court’s decision, Congress decided that an individual could contribute $2,600 to 18 candidates, but the 19th would arbitrarily trigger the appearance or actuality of corruption. 212 An FEC regulation governing free Inter206 Cf. id. (“4 million” represents twenty percent of the 205 million social media users
that follow candidates and elected officials on social media).
207 George F. Will, McCain-Feingold’s Wealth of Hypocrisy, WASH. POST (Nov. 22,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/11/21/AR2007112101859.html.
208 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 2 and 36 U.S.C.).
209 Davis, 554 U.S. at 741.
210 Id. (“The argument that a candidate’s speech may be restricted in order to “level electoral opportunities” has ominous implications because it would permit Congress to arrogate
the voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates competing for office”); see also
Hearing on S.J. Res. 19, supra note 190 (statement of Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill, Gordon & Reindel, LLP).
[Laws based on] the disturbing concept that those who hold office in both federal
and state legislatures, armed with all the advantages of incumbency, may effectively
prevent their opponents from becoming known to the public, by adopting legislation
. . . limiting the total amounts they may raise and spend in an effort to do so.
Id.
211 See George F. Will, Supreme Court Can Rescue Another Freedom In a Campaign
Cash Case, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/georgewill-supreme-court-can-rescue-another-freeom-in-a-campaign-cashcase/2013/10/04/77bd9e42-2d23-11e3-97a3-ff2758228523_story.html.
212 See id.
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net content would not be the product of elected legislators, but it would serve
the interests of the elected. 213 Limiting speech on the Internet would limit dissent, reduce investigation, and deprive our democracy of one of its greatest
assets—free speech.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Internet is the most dynamic populist forum for political speech that we
enjoy today. In the process of becoming the existential plane where more people spend their time, the Internet has also become the principal forum for political debate. The regulation of free political Internet content is not included in
the FEC’s current regulations, and for good reason. Abandoning the FEC’s
2006 Internet rules would restrict the peoples’ right to engage in the realm of
political debate. 214 Additionally, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as
amended does not authorize the FEC to regulate the type of cost-free pure
speech that exists on the Internet. The Act does not authorize the FEC to do so,
because it would be facially unconstitutional and it would chill speech.

213 See id. (“[A]ll laws regulating the competition for elective offices are written by occupants of such offices, people who have a permanent and powerful temptation to shape the
political process to favor incumbents”).
214 Hearing on S.J. Res. 19, supra note 190 (statement of Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill,
Gordon & Reindel, LLP).

